Political reform from a constitutional economics perspective: a hurdle-race ; the case of migration politics in Germany by Borella, Sara
www.ssoar.info
Political reform from a constitutional economics
perspective: a hurdle-race ; the case of migration
politics in Germany
Borella, Sara
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Borella, S. (2005). Political reform from a constitutional economics perspective: a hurdle-race ; the case of migration
politics in Germany. (Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, 05/7). Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter
Eucken Institut e.V.; Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Fakultät,
Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung Abt. Wirtschaftspolitik. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4354
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Walter Eucken Institut
ORDO     Constitutio in Libertate
Freiburger 
Diskussionspapiere 
zur Ordnungsökonomik
Freiburg 
Discussion Papers 
on Constitutional Economics  
IS
S
N
 1
4
3
7
-1
5
1
0
Political reform from
a constitutional economics perspective: 
a hurdle-race.
The case of migration politics
in Germany
Sara Borella
05/7
Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung
Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik
Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg i. Br. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik 
Freiburg Discussionpapers on Constitutional Economics 
05/7 
ISSN 1437-1510 
 
Walter Eucken Institut, Goethestr. 10, D-79100 Freiburg i. Br. 
Tel.Nr.: +49 +761 / 79097 0; Fax.Nr.: +49 +761 / 79097 97 
http://www.walter-eucken-institut.de 
Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung; Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik;  
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, D-79085 Freiburg i. Br. 
Tel.Nr.: +49 +761 / 203 2317; Fax.Nr.: +49 +761 / 203 2322 
http://www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/fakultaet/wipo/ 
Political reform from  
a constitutional economics perspective:  
a hurdle-race.  
The case of migration politics  
in Germany  
 
Sara Borella  
05/7 
 Political reform from a constitutional economics perspective: a hurdle-race  
The case of migration politics in Germany* 
 
Sara Borella** 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper approaches the matter of political reform from the perspective of constitutional 
political economy with particular attention to the case of migration politics in Germany. 
That the process of policy-making has to be a constrained one is a central element of this 
approach, the identification of “desired” and “undesired” constraints its main aim. Through 
the metaphor of the hurdle-race it will be shown that the results of the political process 
depend on the rules of the game of politics on the constitutional level, but can be 
influenced by the contingent obstacles on the subconstitutional level. With reference to 
migration politics in Germany, I will argue that a separation of labour migration from other 
social aspects connected to migration can be useful for a more matter-of-fact discussion in 
this sensitive realm. The influence of subconstitutional events and factors is shown through 
the example of the recently approved German Immigration Act. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the changes and new opportunities brought about by the 
‘globalisation’ process are based on technological progress and, strictly related to it, on the 
faster movement of capital and higher mobility, at least potentially, of individuals1. 
According to the theory of competition among jurisdictions, these developments set local 
national governments under a positive kind of pressure2. In their effort to attract resources, 
they are forced to take the social and economic changes into account and to develop 
appropriate policies in order to meet the interests of the citizens. Instead of being caught in 
the danger of ruinous competition, citizens can profit from the consequences of  stronger 
competition, because it uncovers dysfunctional properties of the institutional design, e.g. of 
the social systems. In many industrialised democracies this process has lead to a broad 
acknowledgment of the shortcomings of the present political settings in many fields, and 
consequently to a call for reforms in certain sectors of social policy, e.g. healthcare, 
pensions etc. Higher individual mobility is a major factor in the globalisation process since 
it reveals the necessity to revise some aspects in the social and labour market policies of 
many countries: social systems tend to get eroded and destabilised because individuals can 
– and actually do – move more intensely between jurisdictions with different social and 
labour market policies. The higher mobility causes negative but also positive externalities 
both in sending and receiving countries that necessitate appropriate national political 
frameworks and provisions for the international coordination among jurisdictions.  
 
Concentrating on the topic of mobility of people between states from a constitutional 
perspective means to focus on the rules affecting mobility. Individuals try to satisfy their 
mobility preferences, at first, under the existing mobility rules. Considering the changes 
and developments in the technical restrictions of mobility, though, the citizens can ask 
whether the actual mobility rules are still able to guarantee the best possible framework for 
their mobility needs. Are they still a useful tool or could common individual interests be 
better fulfilled by an alternative policy design? 
                                                 
1 The constitutional economics arguments that will be put forward in this paper are analytically independent 
from the differentiation between real migration and potential mobility of individuals. Nevertheless, for 
empirical data about the relevance of the issue, see, for worldwide data, the statistics of the International 
Organization for Migration on www.iom.int or of the Migration Policy Institute on 
www.migrationpolicy.org; for OECD countries, the Trends in International Migration and Migration Policies 
2003 and www.oecd.org; for Germany e.g. the statistics of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge on 
www.bafl.de.  
2 Some authors, like H.W. Sinn, consider this pressure as negative and potentially leading to a ruinous 
competition. For a critique of the “race to the bottom” argument, see Vanberg, Viktor (2000), p. 98ff. 
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More than in other political realms, for instance trade liberalisation, nowadays free 
mobility of people due to economic reasons has to overcome more and more non-economic 
obstacles. The aim of this paper is to make a step towards a sober consideration of 
economically driven migration in a more economic view, (mostly) free from the burden of 
political correctness.  
 
I will examine political reform in labour migration policy from the perspective of 
constitutional political economy. Within this approach I will look for a desirable set of 
rules for cross-border labour mobility that is compatible with the aim of a rational 
migration policy. In this first step, some aspects will be pointed out that can contribute to 
the identification of desirable rules. After a short introduction to the field of constitutional 
political economy in paragraph 2, the hurdle-race metaphor will be explained in paragraph 
3. Then, I will look at the peculiarities of migration policy in general (paragraph 4) and 
from the viewpoint of Germany in particular (paragraph 5). Here, dysfunctional effects of 
some provisions will be identified and some proposals for clarification and further reform 
will be advanced. A brief digression in the field of trade in services will be found in 
paragraph 6. The concluding paragraph summarises the steps of the analysis and the reform 
proposals advanced. 
 
2. Political reform from a constitutional economics perspective 
 
Political reform from the perspective of constitutional political economy3 is a process 
which ought to take place on the constitutional level according to the citizens’ common 
interests. In the constitutional approach, there are two levels at which choices can be made: 
the constitutional level, of rule choice or choice among constraints, and the 
subconstitutional level of choice within rules or within constraints. The constitutional level 
is central to the constitutional economics analysis, in contrast to traditional orthodox 
economics, as it is the ‘natural’ arena for political reform, i.e. for the choice of or among 
different sets of rules. The aim of achieving better results on the subconstitutional level is 
not pursued through direct interventions as part of the ‘normal’ subconstitutional political 
process but through a proper design of the rules under which it takes place. The second 
central element is the pursuit of the citizens’ common interests: democratic society is seen 
                                                 
3 For the foundations of constitutional political economy see Buchanan, James M., 1987 and 1990. 
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“as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage”4, where individuals decide to carry out 
their collective actions in “self-governed associations that are supposed to promote the 
shared interests of their members or citizens”5. Whether the common interests of the 
citizens are actually effectively promoted or not can be judged through the constitutional 
test: if and to what extent the measures taken respect the criterion of citizen sovereignty. 
This criterion is defined as the “extent to which political decision-makers are subject to 
constraints that induce responsiveness to citizens’ common interests”6. With this principle 
it is possible to evaluate the appropriateness of political action in a democratic polity. 
Proposals for political reform from a constitutional political economy perspective are 
channelled by and develop within these constraints, which have to be taken into account as 
necessary conditions to be fulfilled when advancing a proposal. General, non-
discriminating rules voluntarily adopted or followed by all members of the jurisdiction are 
more likely to fulfil their common constitutional interests than arbitrary discriminating 
regulations granting some members a particular treatment. 
 
3. The constitutional hurdle-race 
 
The hurdle-race is a metaphor for the procedure that a reform proposal has to undergo in 
the process of becoming a new rule of the game. Not every procedure is compatible with a 
democratic system, and not every method is desirable: the process of rule-creation is a 
constrained one. Two kinds of hurdles can be analytically distinguished. First, there are 
hurdles that represent desirable regulations or provisions existing on the constitutional 
level in order to guarantee that the procedures and, as a consequence, the actual measures 
resulting from them satisfy certain criteria, in our context: constitutional criteria. These 
hurdles are the constitutional constraints. The members of the polity decide voluntarily to 
commit to these rules because they expect advantages from them that they would not be 
able to realise otherwise. Secondly, there are unintended hurdles that emerge on the 
subconstitutional level as an undesired result of the application of the rules and as a 
consequence of individual behaviour. In this last case, obstacles emerge from the fact that 
the common agreement on the general validity of a rule on the constitutional level is not 
sufficient to its individual implementation: the interest in introducing a rule does not 
necessarily imply the willingness to follow the precepts in particular situations on the level 
                                                 
4 Rawls, John (1971), p. 84. 
5 Vanberg, Viktor (2001a), p. 35. 
6 Vanberg, Viktor (2004b), p.51. 
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of actions. The undesired consequences of both rule following and rule breaking on the 
subconstitutional level can indirectly influence the process of rule creation at the 
constitutional level. Prisoners’ dilemma situations can distort the dynamics of the national 
political process. Moreover, there can be events and incidents causing relevant shifts in the 
common interests of the jurisdiction members, as observable in the reaction to the recent 
wave of terrorism. These are subconstitutional obstacles as well. The concept of political 
reform within this metaphor can be represented as the race of one or more proposals to 
reach the approval in a jurisdiction. The length of the track and the height of the hurdles 
can make the race more successful and efficient7 for the individuals concerned according 
to the constitutional criteria. Yet the result also depends on the contingent obstacles on the 
subconstitutional level, so that there is scope for questioning the characteristics of the 
hurdle on both levels. 
 
One last general aspect has to be considered. Although nation states represent the 
constitutional level jurisdiction for the domestic political process, they are not separate and 
independent identities at the international level. There are levels of jurisdiction above the 
national level and, therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the distinction of the two 
orders of rules is only a relative one: “What is a matter of constitutional choice at one level 
of jurisdiction can be viewed as subconstitutional choice in relation to a more inclusive 
level of jurisdiction”8. This aspect is relevant for migration politics; both in the field of 
asylum and refugee politics and of economic migration, national political actors are 
constrained by well established and broadly enforceable international rules. As far as 
politically motivated migration is concerned, there are strict provisions at the international 
level since the Geneva Convention in 1949. Labour migration, too, is no longer a matter of 
exclusive national competence. Nation states give up part of their sovereignty in this field 
through binding commitments at the international level: European Union members at the 
moment of their joining the Union, and because of membership in international 
organisations, e.g. the WTO. These kinds of supra-national constraints will be briefly 
discussed below in relation to trade in services, as far as the supply of services implies 
movement of individuals across borders9.  
                                                 
7 In this context efficiency is always meant in relation to the criterion of citizens’ sovereignty. A rule is more 
efficient than another if it guarantees a better fulfilment of the common constitutional interests of the 
individuals affected by it. 
8 Vanberg, Viktor (2001a), p. 34. 
9 Currently, negotiations concerning the General Agreement on Trade in Services are under way in the 
context of the Doha Round. 
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3.1 Constitutional constraints 
 
From the perspective of constitutional economics, constitutional constraints are viewed as 
rules on the constitutional level supposed to lead political actions in a direction compatible 
with the citizens’ sovereignty. They result from commitments among the citizens on 
characteristics of the jurisdiction; citizens bind themselves under these commitments in 
order to achieve aims and produce advantages that they would not be able to achieve or 
produce individually. They hope to realise gains from joint commitment10. There are two 
kinds of rules at this level: rules of substance, or substantive rules, and procedural rules. 
Substantive rules define the content of individual rights and duties: for instance 
constitutional rights such as freedom and property rights, formal equality, or the principle 
of social justice and the welfare state. The citizenship rules belong to this category as well; 
they define who is member of the jurisdiction, which rights and duties are linked to this 
status, and what conditions determine its acquisition and loss. Procedural rules define the 
procedures under which rules can be changed or collective action can take place. They set 
the characteristics of the decision-making process, like the principle of government under 
the law, or rule of law, and the different electoral systems: in a democratic polity with a 
representative government this could include the possibility of referenda. With a 
proportional electoral system, for instance, the process of political reform has to overcome 
obstacles different from those in a jurisdiction with direct democracy and a majoritarian 
electoral system. 
 
Both kinds of constitutional constraints or rules originate from political decision, 
institutional design, legal provision, or historical and cultural development. These are the 
hurdles on the constitutional level; they have to be overcome as a test of the constitutional 
appropriateness of the new rule. The compositions of these elements “describe the 
constitution of any organized polity, and this constitution will, in its turn, influence the 
pattern of collective outcomes that may be observed”11. On the constitutional level the 
rules can be seen as useful instruments12 that define the private sphere of individuals and 
the leeway for their actions. This leeway is mostly defined ex negativo, i.e. it is specified 
through exclusion of strategies not desired by the actors; hence constraints. In the 
Hayekian tradition, the rules of the game have two central characteristics: they are 
negatively formulated and universalisable, i.e. generally applicable in a non-discriminatory 
                                                 
10 Vanberg, Viktor (2004a), p. 154. 
11 Buchanan, James (2003), p. 3. 
12 On the function of rules as tools see Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976), vol. 2, p. 21. 
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way to all individuals concerned13. If constitutional rules have such universalisable 
characteristics and if they establish binding constraints on subconstitutional choices of 
rules, the latter can be argued to be responsive to the common interests of the citizens. 
 
3.2 Subconstitutional constraints 
 
The subconstitutional level is the level where individual action takes place; individuals try 
to fulfil their preferences under the restrictions they are confronted with. The whole 
complex of the constitutional provisions represents for the actors a higher-level 
institutional framework of constraints to their actions. The effects of a political measure 
introduced at the constitutional level become evident on the subconstitutional level. The 
impact of rule implementation can turn out differently from what was intended, 
particularly when the rules are not perfectly resistant to opportunistic behaviour. Generally, 
it is always possible that the application of a new measure causes unpredicted failures, but 
what is referred to here in particular is that the new provision may have to deal with 
elements in the system that pose unforeseen implementation obstacles. These 
imperfections do not concern the measure itself, they are independent from it, but they can 
influence its outcome on the level of actions. These are not desired rules or regulations, but 
the result of market and policy failure. These hurdles at the subconstitutional level will be 
referred to as obstacles; the hurdle-race will be more efficient14 if these can be lowered. 
Current political processes show a variety of examples for these imperfections: rent-
seeking and lobbying activities, protectionism and subsidies-granting politics. In matters of 
labour migration, national prisoners’ dilemma situations and an emotional bias like fear of 
dominating foreign influences are, among others, high obstacles on the subconstitutional 
level. Some of these aspects will be considered in the next paragraph.  
 
4. The peculiarity of migration politics 
 
Labour mobility of individuals is a matter of national migration policy, a realm that is 
strongly subject to ‘globalisation pressure’, as mentioned above. Migration policy is a 
relevant instrument for governments in international competition and therefore an 
important item on the reform-agenda. The mobility rules can be used instrumentally to 
                                                 
13 See also Buchanan, James and Congleton, Roger (1998) on the ‘generality norm’. 
14 See footnote n.7. 
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attract resources or, from the opposite viewpoint, to restrict the free inflow into particular 
sectors of the labour market. In this sense, the hurdles can be intentionally set higher or 
lower in order to achieve specific results. The appropriateness of these rules becomes 
increasingly relevant in a system where other traditional barriers to mobility fall. 
Moreover, migration is a sensitive field of economic policy for the citizenry of a polity. 
The debate on immigration, in particular, has often been dominated by current political 
issues, for instance the discussion on asylum rights in the past, and on security and 
protection from terrorism recently. 
 
4.1 The definition of migration 
 
I will focus on voluntary economic migration, by contrast to migration forced by political 
or ecological reasons. There are of course countries where the economic situation is of 
such extreme poverty that a factual distinction between voluntary and forced migration 
seems to be impossible. The analytical distinction, though, remains possible and, 
empirically, those are not the countries which show relevant emigration flows15. Bimal 
Ghosh distinguishes between ‘opportunity-seeking migrants’ and ‘survival migrants, due to 
poverty’16. According to the distinction proposed in this contribution, these two categories 
are part of the economically motivated migration, representing different intensity degrees 
within the same group. As opposed to them, people forced to migrate for political reasons 
could be defined as ‘survival migrants, due to persecution’. It can be argued that the two 
kinds of ‘survival migration’ often occur together; nevertheless, the analytical distinction 
still remains possible. Asylum seekers and political refugees are not the subject of this 
analysis. The individuals considered are motivated most often by economic incentives, but 
it is not necessary to know whether this is the final cause of migration for them or not; 
relevant is their decision to stay and work in a foreign country. This will be referred to as 
economic or labour migration. As one aspect of the general analysis of the economic 
policy measures adopted in a democratic state in order to deal with legal economic 
migration, I will concentrate on the recent experiences in the German political process. 
 
                                                 
15 According to the empirical evidence and theory of the ‘migration hump’, the extreme economic conditions 
and the political situation in the least developed countries are often such as to make mobility impossible, see 
Martin, Philip (2002) and, for the ‘migration hump’ in particular, Martin, Philip (2003), p. 10. 
16 Ghosh, Bimal (2000), p. 241. 
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4.2 Constraints in the realm of migration politics 
 
As far as exit barriers are concerned, citizens share two kinds of interests. On the one hand, 
assuming that there are relevant alternatives, the possibility of exercising an exit-option 
represents a protection for individuals from collective actions taken against their interests. 
The lower the mobility barriers are, the higher is this protection. On the other hand, as 
mentioned above, the members of a jurisdiction commit to rules about collective action in 
order to realise projects which would be impossible through individual action. Since all 
jurisdiction members have a common interest in the implementation of long term projects, 
they can have a common interest in some kind of barriers to exit, at least for a limited time. 
A trade-off exists between their preference for mobility and their preference for 
boundaries, that is between the possibility of an exit-option and a continuity-guarantee. 
This topic will not be discussed further in this context, focusing on the barriers to entry. In 
fact, some long term common goals can be influenced by the entry mobility barriers as 
well or, more precisely by the level and composition of the immigration movements 
resulting from them. As a positive factor, for example, immigration is needed if a country 
faces a demographical development such Western Europe at present, even if this is not a 
solution of the problem posed by the demographic development in the long run. And still, 
the population in the receiving countries rather perceives the negative consequences of 
immigration than the positive aspects. These consequences are connected with the 
existence of a social security system and are aggravated by failures in the economic 
system: as far as labour migration is concerned, for instance, the inflexibility of the labour 
market and the high costs of the local labour force can affect the attitude towards migration 
politics. Moreover, immigrants are individuals with different cultures and different 
languages. This could cause externalities on the ‘sense of community’ of the nationals. 
Even if it is deemed possible to isolate economically motivated migration, the immigrants 
use some non-excludable common pool resources more intensely17 or challenge the 
“spiritual public goods”18 of the receiving country. In the following I will maintain the 
focus on mobility of labour and try to identify which constitutional and subconstitutional 
constraints are relevant in this respect. 
 
On the constitutional level, different kinds of rules and commitments limit the leeway of 
political actors in the design of mobility measures; they define the race-track in this 
                                                 
17 Foreign immigrants benefit systematically more from certain public goods and less from others. See Thum, 
Marcel (2004), p. 426. 
18 Bernholz, Peter (1994), p. 283. 
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discipline. National politicians have to consider several constitutional constraints on the 
political process and, at the same time, they are limited by international commitments at 
the supra-national level. With respect to the multilevel characteristics of the system 
discussed above, in the field of migration policy, European Union regulations represent for 
national politicians a higher-level framework of rules of the game, which limit the scope of 
permissible strategies. The European Union itself, as an autonomous political actor, is 
bound by higher-level international organisations. The WTO General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, for instance, includes binding provisions for the supply of services through 
international movement of natural persons. Choices taken by national politicians cannot 
ignore these higher level frameworks of rules; rather, such choices are to be considered as 
subconstitutional in this perspective. 
 
4.3 On values and emotional concerns 
 
At the level of actions, migration policy measures are confronted with general and specific 
obstacles. Similar to other sectors of social policy, the presence of broad welfare-state 
provisions causes interdependences among the economic and the social systems. A large 
part of the externalities emerging from individual movements is caused by their effects on 
services or public goods provided by the government. The social consequences of 
economic politics affect the implementation of a rational labour migration policy. Further 
problems are caused by the possibility for those entrepreneurs who fear the pressure of 
international competition to exert influence on political actors through privilege-seeking 
activities. If the employers recognise the possibility to ally with the employees fearing to 
lose their jobs to less expensive or better qualified labour force from abroad, they can 
strategically put together the two different issues and achieve an even stronger influence. 
This issue can be seen as a prisoners’ dilemma situation in analogy to the description of the 
protectionism dynamics in international trade. Similar to the constitutional economics 
interpretation of the trade-liberalisation dilemma19, it is central to point out that these 
dynamics are not caused by conflicts of interests among nations but occur within the 
different countries on the national level. Moreover, these dilemma situations take place on 
the subconstitutional level. These are Verdrängungsängste: the fear of economic crowding 
out and of labour displacement. The validity of these hurdles can be countered with 
                                                 
19 Vanberg, Viktor (2001b), p. 116f. 
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economic arguments, as has been done since the emergence of classical liberalism. This 
allows the distinction between these concerns and the labour migration issue.  
 
Another aspect influencing individual behaviour in this respect is the Überfremdungsangst, 
the fear of being dominated by foreign influences, up to the possibility of becoming a 
minority. These concerns cannot be so easily swept away with economic arguments and 
represent a significant obstacle for an objective discussion of the problem. One could argue 
that the conception of democratic polity as a joint enterprise with the aim of pursuing 
common interests should secure protection from developments inimical to the members’ 
preferences. The conception of states as clubs supports this view, since only the members 
of the club can decide which changes have to take place; moreover foreigners do not 
normally become full members of the club at once20. At the same time, though, these fears 
on the subconstitutional level, caused by increasing foreign presence, should not be played 
down. They are a spontaneous reaction of the members of a community facing the 
necessity to deal with different cultures and values. The dilemma of impersonal exchange 
in the traditional trade situation acquires a new dimension; instead of the absence of a 
common juridical basis to secure transactions as a third party enforcer, the problem at stake 
here is the absence of common fundamental values, habits and customs. Even if foreign 
values, cultures and religions do not become effective through the constitutional channel, 
i.e. through rule change, because the individuals representing them are not (yet) entitled to 
participate in collective decisions, they will become noticeable for individuals on the level 
of actions if changes in their environment take place. Many members of a community have 
a spontaneous preference for similar values and cultures, and this might even be a rational 
preference, if ‘heterogeneity’ has some influence on the conditions for the realisation of 
cooperation gains. Hayek would recognise in these feelings of uneasiness the emergence of 
“the emotions of the tribal society”21 but as a matter of fact, although these emotions 
concern the subconstitutional level, they can indirectly influence the order of rules. This 
can happen if political actors find the way to exploit them in the pursuit of their electoral 
strategy.  
 
                                                 
20 For instance, it is quite improbable that the All England Croquet and Lawn Tennis Club will be 
transformed in a football club unless fundamental changes in the membership rule occur. 
21 Hayek, Friedrich A. (1976), vol. 2, p. 133ff. 
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In the constitutional perspective, the role of political economists requires impartiality and a 
judgement-free approach to economic topics22. The constitutional political economist 
formulates proposals in the form of hypothetical imperatives23, which include a conditional 
component: If you want X, you should do Y, because Y is a suitable means to achieve X. 
Y is an instrument or a measure that the economist suggests to apply, given that the 
individuals concerned want to achieve the result X. Hence, for the constitutional 
economist, the conditions posed in the “if-component” of the imperative are to a certain 
extent given. Some revision of traditional values and beliefs can of course take place, and 
one can ask whether X is in the interest of all individuals involved, but at first this 
condition has to be considered as fixed24.  
 
Most of the problems in dealing with immigrants, as far as values are concerned, arise 
from the very fact of dealing with foreign influences, which is a delicate subject, 
particularly in Germany. A great part of the burden in the discussion of the treatment of 
foreigners would disappear, if the above mentioned isolation of the economic motives of 
mobility took place. This would lead to a more neutral conception of labour movement. I 
am not suggesting to apply a neoclassical approach and consider workers as factors that are 
pushed or pulled in any direction, since this is not compatible with the assumptions of the 
constitutional perspective. Free movement of people evidently causes externalities that 
other factors do not cause. Nevertheless, an economic approach is more effective in 
matters of labour migration: it allows to refer strictly to the factors determining 
economically driven mobility and to ignore pure humanitarian aspects, which are not at 
stake here. The crowding-out fears mentioned above, concerning the economic 
consequences of immigration in general, could be discussed separately from other 
concerns, and they could be addressed with economic arguments.  
 
The distinction between economic and political matters is not always clear-cut, not even 
for the analytical purposes of an argument. Among the possible examples of this problem 
is the fact that immigrant workers have the right to bring family members with them under 
certain circumstances. This possibility does not fit, at first sight, in the scope of economic 
                                                 
22 According to Hans Albert’s differentiation between ‘Objektbereich’, ‘Inhaltsbereich’ und ‘Basisbereich’ a 
scientist should avoid value-judgments in the ‘Inhaltsbereich’. Albert, Hans (1972), p. 189f. 
23 Vanberg, Viktor (1997), p. 709. 
24 The second test for the hypothetical imperative is whether Y is an appropriate instrument to achieve the 
desired results. Hypothetical imperatives are employed in the disciplines of applied sciences. Vanberg, Viktor 
(1997), p. 709ff. 
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analysis. Admittedly, the right to family reunification is a delicate matter in relation to the 
economic analysis of the immigration of labour force. This right has been established at the 
constitutional level for other than economic reasons, but it influences the decision process 
on the amount of labour migration. The aim of allowing the entrance of labour force could 
result in the commitment to a package-deal including more than one person. However, 
from a different perspective, the possibility of family reunification can be seen as an 
incentive to attract labour in a situation of international competition, so that desired 
immigrants who could have the choice among different countries would prefer one with 
this kind of provisions. If the mobility rules are adequately set and if qualified immigrants 
are needed in the receiving community, the immigrants work and contribute to the welfare 
state with their taxes. Family reunification can actually cause externalities on the labour 
market or on the level of utilisation of public goods. To face this problem, it might be 
worth examining whether these effects are due to inadequate rules in the system involved, 
i.e. mainly the rules of the social security systems. If this case can be excluded, or not 
solved without fully renouncing the right to family reunification, it will still be unnecessary 
to revise the rule’s general application: alternative compensation measures for particular 
and objectively proven external effects can be applied on the subconstitutional level. 
 
To recapitulate, concerns about changes in the dominant traditional and cultural 
environment of the native community escape pure economics-based reasoning. However, 
they do not escape rationality considerations. Warnings of a threat to democracy posed by 
an excessive opening of national boundaries to foreigners should not be ignored. They 
form an important part of the Überfremdungsängste mentioned above. This threat is 
supposed to be caused by the destabilisation of the democratic system as it is generally 
feared by the opponents of globalisation. In the case of persistent entry of individuals who 
do not share democratic principles, of course, the problem seems to be evident. 
Appropriate rules are those which can guarantee that no decision is taken that is inimical to 
the interests of the individuals concerned. If a destabilisation of democracy is possible to 
the extent that its very foundations are at risk, the rules are not defined in an appropriate 
way.  
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4.4 On cross-border externalities 
 
Critics of labour migration liberalisation point at the danger of international externalities, 
not limited to the national social security systems or related to the consumption of public 
goods or, more precisely, common pool resources. They support a similar free-riding 
argument as in the case of provisions of public goods with positive externalities across the 
borders of the jurisdiction. According to this argument, the option of opening a country’s 
boundaries to more migration could have positive external effects on other jurisdictions 
unwilling to open as well, particularly the immediate neighbours, which could profit from 
a lower immigration pressure. It is possible that they are not interested in cooperation, 
similarly to countries which have a favourable geographical position protecting them from 
strong migration pressures. In any case, these neighbours or protected political entities 
could have incentives to exploit their favourable position; this free-rider behaviour can be 
anticipated from the liberalisation-oriented country, leading to the conclusion that, so the 
argument, it is advisable for this country not to move first in this direction. These free-
riding fears do not consider two aspects. First, the decision of neighbours to adopt a free-
rider strategy is not relevant for the jurisdiction opening its borders for labour migration, 
because the movements across borders will still be controlled by national migration 
politics, as it would be in any case. If the opening jurisdiction proves to be negatively 
affected by the free-rider behaviour of the others, then the problem is caused by its 
inappropriate migration policy rules. Secondly, even if there are inter-jurisdictional 
externalities that affect the movements of people, the solution is not to be found in a 
restrictive policy; rather, it would be worth looking for “appropriate international (inter-
jurisdictional) agreements on rules directly addressing the externality issue”25, rather than 
renounce liberalisation at all.  
 
5. The hurdle-race in German migration policy 
 
A striking illustration of the metaphor of the hurdle-race is Germany’s immigration law 
passed last June, taking effect in January 200526. The independent commission chaired by 
the former President of the German Bundestag Rita Süssmuth was appointed in mid-2000, 
the law passed for the first time in June 2002 and definitively in June 2004, after the 
                                                 
25 Vanberg, Viktor (2000), p. 98. 
26 The complete text of the “Immigration Act” in English can be downloaded on the website of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, see Bundesministerium des Innern (2004). 
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Constitutional Court had overturned the first Parliament decision and new negotiations had 
taken place. The mediation process was strongly influenced by the necessity for the 
government coalition to reach a broader support, i.e. more votes than the government 
coalition had in both houses of parliament. The comparison between the 2002-law and the 
definitive ‘Immigration Act’ passed in 2004 shows interesting changes, basically 
subsumable under the concept of a general shift from the labour to the security focus as a 
reaction to the Iraq war and as a result of the investigations on the terror attacks in several 
parts of the world27. Conservative parties calling for even tougher anti-extremist measures 
could negotiate their approval posing conditions on other issues, mainly on those 
concerning the regulation of work force inflow.  
 
In general, the Immigration Act provides for new structures in labour migration as well as 
in humanitarian immigration issues. The Act is strictly related to the new ‘Residence Act’, 
which will substitute the old ‘Foreigners’ Act’, starting from January 2005. The residence 
titles are reduced to two: the (limited) residence permit and the (unlimited) settlement 
permit. The important role of integration is acknowledged and supported through the 
introduction of compulsory integration courses. Foreigners will have to participate in 
language courses and integration courses on German law, culture and history. As far as 
labour migration in particular is concerned, moreover, some relevant changes will take 
place. The Act provides for highly qualified employees such as engineers, computer 
technicians, researchers and business leaders to be granted permanent residence by means 
of the settlement permit from the outset28, and German firms will be allowed to recruit 
highly qualified workers. Less qualified workers can apply for a limited residence permit if 
they can prove that they have been offered a job that could not have been given to any 
applicant from within Germany or the EU. Self-employed persons are to receive a 
residence permit if they invest at least 1 million Euro and create at least 10 new jobs. 
Students have now the possibility to stay in Germany and seek employment for up to one 
year after completing their degree. Some bureaucratic procedures have been simplified; 
work permit and residence permit, for instance, will be issued in a single act. Differently 
from the first version of the law, approved in 2002, the ban on recruitment (Anwerbestopp) 
of unqualified, low qualified and qualified persons has been maintained. Recruitment is 
                                                 
27 Stefan Theil (2004) states provocatively that, „[a]s if a German John Ashcroft had taken over, the law has 
turned into a long list of anti-terrorist and anti-extremist measures“. 
28 The permanent settlement for highly qualified persons is regulated in § 19 of the new ‘Residence Act’. It 
was originally meant to be substituted from a point system, but this was abolished in the second version of 
the law; this point will be discussed in paragraph 5.2.  
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free only for the high qualified employees. Qualified persons are exempted form the 
limitations of the Anwerbestopp in justified instances and when there is a public interest.  
 
The main emphasis of the 2004 Immigration Act, compared to the preceding formulations 
of 2002, is undoubtedly on security aspects. Before foreigners are given a permanent 
residency permit or allowed to become German citizens, they will have to undergo a 
compulsory procedure of control by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz). Although the procedure is already possible under 
existing legislation, it has been rarely used till now; in the future, it will become obligatory. 
As far as integration is concerned, the right to take courses has actually to be considered a 
duty, because the foreigners who do not take part in the courses will face sanctions, such as 
rejection of applications to extend their residence permit or reduction in benefits. However, 
the most relevant provisions of the new law concern the introduction of a deportation 
order. A repatriation of potential terrorists can be ordered on the basis of a threat 
“prognosis based on facts” (§ 58, a, 1). The individual need not have committed a crime in 
Germany for the deportation order to come into effect: the expulsion is possible when 
“facts justifiably lead to the conclusion that a foreigner belongs to or has belonged to an 
organisation which supports terrorism or supports or has supported such an organisation” 
(§ 54, 5). In cases where expulsion is not possible, because the individual faces the danger 
of torture or death penalty in the home country, the suspect can remain in Germany under 
tight restrictions limiting freedom of movement and communication. The new law 
introduces a regular expulsion for leaders of banned organisations and a discretionary 
expulsion of religious extremists and agitators such as radical preachers. It will be possible 
to deport people involved in human trafficking if they have been imprisoned for such 
crime. 
 
After this short overview of the law, I will concentrate on a few aspects concerning in 
particular the arguments presented in this paper. 
 
5.1 General distinctions 
 
The field of labour migration politics seems to be linked with other realms of social policy 
through interdependences and externalities. Therefore, it will be necessary to unbind the 
topic of migration politics from its ties with other fields. Traditionally, migration politics is 
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conceived as the bundle of instruments regulating entry and exit of individuals, whether 
they are seeking work, asylum, or political protection. In this connotation, migration 
measures end up as a list of procedural and administrative regulations, which is not much 
more than a visa policy. This is not compatible with the concept of migration adopted in 
this contribution. If the emphasis is shifted to the immigrant’s willingness to stay and 
work29, some more leeway is given to a constitutional economics approach to the matter.  
 
The following general distinctions can help lower the hurdles on the race-track. First of all, 
the topic of political migration has to be separated from the economic mobility of people. 
The former could be handled from a domestic and foreign policy perspective, while 
questions concerning the latter would be better taken care of in the economic affairs 
department. Similarly, mobility matters should be separated from security claims30. 
Understandably, after “9/11”, people feel a higher need for security and protection from 
international terrorism, and this social issue pervades every political field. Nevertheless, it 
is a matter of discipline for the economists to resist this trend and preserve the analytical 
focus in the search for alternative solutions to be proposed to the individuals. Finally, 
labour migration has to be treated separately from development economics topics. The 
efforts of western industrialised countries in the promotion of progress and development in 
the Third World constitute an autonomous political issue that can certainly be analysed and 
discussed from economic viewpoints. The aim of managing the labour migration flows 
through direct intervention in emigration countries is not compatible with the constitutional 
approach and the key requirements for a legitimate and efficient political action described 
above.  
 
5.2 On the point system in the German Immigration Law 
 
As far as labour migration is concerned, the most evident change in the definitive law is 
the absence of the point system. It was originally planned that applicants who meet certain 
criteria in categories like age, education, family status, country of origin etc. would be 
included in a ranking list. According to yearly quota, high-level immigration candidates 
would have been granted an unlimited settlement permit. This provision did not reach the 
end of the hurdle-race. As a result of the negotiations about the immigration law the central 
element of the provisions on labour migration was dropped along the way: There will be 
                                                 
29 Straubhaar, Thomas (2000, 2001). 
30 Tomei, Verónica (2001), p. 49. 
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no selection of economically attractive migrants, because the point system was not 
substituted by any other means of active selection. The particular design of the point 
system proposed was not faultless, but the instrument as such is compatible with the 
general reflections underlying this paper: the consideration of economically driven 
migration from a more economic perspective, relieved from the burden of political 
correctness. That the receiving jurisdiction should be allowed to set criteria for the 
admission of foreigners who obtain an unlimited settlement permit immediately after 
crossing the border is as such politically correct in a constitutional economics perspective: 
correct towards the citizens of the relevant jurisdiction, according to whose interests 
national political representatives ought to act.  
 
Hence, the introduction of the point system should be reconsidered, reformulated and 
proposed to debate in the political process as a desirable hurdle in order to make the race-
track more efficient and rewarding for both, insiders and newcomers. This would also 
allow for some improvements. The criteria according to which points are assigned are very 
important and deserve more than an abstract listing – for instance, what was the 
requirement of a ‘particular relationship to Germany’ supposed to mean? But still more 
relevant is the possibility to eliminate any quantitative restrictionn from the system, 
whether or not they are explicitly called quota. Instead of fixing a maximum of permits per 
year for the best ranked candidates, it would be more compatible with the approach 
supported here that there should be a minimum level of points that a potential resident has 
to reach. Whether ten or ten thousand candidates achieved this minimum, the result would 
than have to be accepted. These are the characteristics of non-discriminating procedures. 
 
Improvements of the criteria could be necessary and should therefore be possible. If the 
amount of immigrants allowed to enter is permanently too low, the jurisdiction will 
perceive the consequences on the labour market and revise the criteria, which are on the 
rule level. This is more compatible with the constitutional approach than a yearly revision 
of the quota. If too many immigrants meet the requirements, similarly, there should be the 
possibility of revision as well. The candidates to immigration through this channel, in fact, 
do not need to have a proof of employment beforehand, but this could be left to the market, 
and the legal effectiveness of the settlement permit could be combined, at least as far as 
some consequences of it are concerned, with the actual employment. In both cases, though, 
if the criteria prove to be set according to the common preferences of the citizens, the aim 
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of an active qualitative selection would be inconsistently applied if quantitative elements 
are included ex post.  
 
With the new immigration law, German migration politics has been designed in a positive 
and comprehensive way for the first time31, establishing the new constitutional rules of the 
game of individual mobility into the country. In making use of this competence, however, 
the political agents were also bound by the provision of international commitments, which 
constitute a higher level constraint in the decision-making process. Multilateral agreements 
and other international contracts do not only represent a framework of constraints limiting 
the leeway of national politicians, but also a chance for the member states. Apart from the 
protection granted by international enforcing parties, cooperation gains and knowledge 
improvements can be realised. On the international level, the single members have the 
possibility of reciprocal action and of overcoming national hindering factors, e.g. 
prisoners’ dilemma situations. Nevertheless, in the field of migration policy, an attitude of 
caution and hesitation prevails on the national as well as on the international level: even if 
a polity aims at a liberalisation, takes on political reforms in this direction, and even binds 
itself through international agreements made for this reason, a trace of reluctance remains. 
As I mentioned at the beginning, the economic mobility of people has to overcome high 
non-economic obstacles. Liberalisation in this realm seems to be connected with loss of 
power or control over some crucial elements of the community itself. The example of trade 
in services supplied by persons across borders is striking in this context. Although a 
negotiations round is under way with the aim of opening the boundaries to more service-
related movement, the European Union as a negotiating partner and the single EU-member 
states within it still hesitate to make concessions. These concessions seem to be seen as an 
expensive indulgence. In the next paragraph the chance for Germany in this field will be 
briefly addressed as a further example of the obstacles that can exist in the hurdle-race. 
 
6. The chance in the service sector 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was signed by the WTO member 
states to regulate and liberalise the trade in services in analogy to the GATT provisions 
regarding the trade of goods. The supply of services is classified in four categories: cross-
border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons. 
                                                 
31 The guest worker programmes of the period between 1955 and 1973 cannot be considered as 
comprehensive policy. 
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This last mode is relevant in our context, being the form of supply through temporary 
movement of natural persons into the territory of another member state32. It seems quite 
obvious that people have to move temporarily to supply those kinds of services that cannot 
be otherwise provided, but the WTO member states were quite reluctant to liberalise this 
sector during the first round of negotiations about services (Uruguay round from 1986 to 
1994). The liberalisation does not apply to persons aiming at obtaining citizenship, 
residence or employment on a permanent basis in a member state. Nevertheless, the 
member countries are concerned about the effects of large mobility. These fears are 
reflected in the formulations of the WTO about the application of measures affecting the 
mobility of persons:  
 
The Agreement shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to regulate 
the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including 
those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly 
movement of natural persons across, its borders, provided that such measures are 
not applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any 
Member under the terms of a specific commitment33. 
 
Currently, the movement of natural persons for service supply is being discussed in the 
context of the negotiations started in 2000 as part of the Doha round34. The negotiation 
offer submitted by the European Union in April 2003 testifies to a moderate intention to 
liberalise the supply of services through movement of natural persons: the offers concern 
only the movement of the highly qualified service suppliers; quantitative restrictions 
according to the protection clause quoted above are maintained as well as those for the 
protection of the national labour markets35. Germany has supported mainly concessions in 
the first three modes of supply and fails to put pressure on the liberalisation of the fourth.  
 
The ongoing negotiation activity on the mobility of persons36 is a chance for the member 
states to improve the possibilities for gains from trade – in services – according to the 
common interests of the citizens they represent. If this market enlargement is desirable, the 
                                                 
32 The “Presence of natural persons consists of persons of one Member entering the territory of another 
Member to supply a service (e.g. accountants, doctors or teachers)”, WTO (2004a). The Annex on Movement 
of Natural Persons specifies, however, that Members remain free to operate measures regarding citizenship, 
residence or access to the employment market on a permanent basis.” WTO (2004b) for the modes and 
(2004c) for the Annex. 
33 Paragraph 2 of the ‘Annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under the agreement’, WTO 
(2004c). 
34 The negotiations are carried out under the ‘request-offer’ method: participants in the services negotiations 
exchange bilateral initial requests and offers, the deadline is January 1 2005, such as scheduled for the overall 
negotiation round. More information on www.wto.org. 
35 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2004). 
36 For a detailed analysis see Mattoo, Aaditya and Antonia Carzaniga, ed. (2003). 
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European Union should commit itself to a broader liberalisation than the one planned in the 
actual proposal. Possible aims are for instance the expansion of market access and a better 
coordination of the visa procedures, a wider application of the mutual recognition principle 
to education titles and qualifications, as well as provisions for the acknowledgment of 
contributions to the foreign social security systems. The introduction of a specific 
permission for the supply of services within the GATS countries, the so-called ‘GATS 
visa’, can further improve the conditions for temporary movements of persons, since both 
long waiting times and complex bureaucratic regulations usually represent a relevant 
hurdle for the fast and flexible world of service-supply. All these aspects should be seized 
because they can be used as discriminating instruments with the same function as entry 
barriers. Each measure intended to overcome the arbitrariness of the different procedures 
applied in the member states in these numerous fields is desirable from the point of view of 
constitutional economics, because it contributes to the generalisation of non-discriminating 
rules that satisfy the common constitutional interests of the citizens. In conclusion, it is 
advisable for the European Union to reconsider the advantages of the liberalisation of the 
service sector and to dare a more comprehensive approach to the issue. Measures for 
opening the market in the field of service supply could introduce more favourable 
conditions for trade in services and would reflect the aim and purpose of the Agreement, 
and ultimately of the membership in the WTO. As mentioned in the paragraph above, 
caution and hesitation are nonetheless the dominant attitudes in this field. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Higher mobility is a consequence of the fall of technical and institutional barriers because 
of the globalisation process. At the same time, mobility is the cause of a faster and more 
efficient discovery of problems and dysfunctional characteristics in the social systems of 
the jurisdictions involved. Among other fields, this discovery procedure has pointed out 
shortcomings in the current rules on labour migration in most of the industrialised 
democracies, particularly in Europe. In this paper, some undesired hurdles have been 
examined from a constitutional economics perspective. Some proposals could be made as 
to how these hurdles can be lowered or eliminated. The strict separation of labour 
migration from other social aspects of the cross border mobility of individuals is an 
example. Moreover, starting from very recent legislation such as the German Immigration 
Act or the ongoing negotiations on trade in services, some possibilities for amelioration 
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have been proposed. As a general maxim, in conclusion, it is possible to say that changes 
and reforms, whether piecemeal or all at once, can be welcomed from the perspective of 
constitutional political economy if they make a contribution to the generalisation of the 
rules, so that they can be applied in a non-discriminating manner. These characteristics of 
rules are desirable and do not cause problems themselves; on the contrary they help to 
discover failures in the system. The distinctions and revisions proposed can be seen as a 
contribution in this direction, with the purpose to improve the rules on the constitutional 
level in a way that can produce the desired results on the subconstitutional level in spite of 
the obstacles that are to be met there. 
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